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ABSTRACT Power line communication (PLC) has enabled many smart grid applications and functionalities
over the past few years. Secure communications over such links however remain a crucial aspect for further
development. Due to their shared nature, akin to wireless, PLC channels can benefit from many wireless-
type security techniques, including physical layer security. To this end, and in contrast to existing studies,
which focus on non-cooperative PLC systems, this paper considers the application of physical layer security
in cooperative PLC networks in the presence of passive eavesdropping. We analyze the performance of
such systems using log-normal correlated channel models considering background and impulsive noise
components. Furthermore, the impact of PLC/wireless coding diversity on the system secrecy capacity is
evaluated. The results include accurate mathematical expressions for providing an insight into the secrecy
capacity and outage probability performance of such systems under various network scenarios.
INDEX TERMS Coding diversity, average secrecy capacity, jamming, correlated log-normal channels,
physical layer security, power line communications, relaying, secrecy outage probability, smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rising demand for electricity, in both the domestic and
industrial sectors, coupled with the need to enhance power
efficiency and control made it necessary to modernize the
aging electricity grid. This is commonly accomplished using
power line communication (PLC), which is often preferred
over the other alternatives, such asWiFi, fiber optics, because
PLC exploits existing power cables and hence can be effi-
ciently deployed. In general, PLC is divided into narrow-
band (NB) and broad-band (BB) systems with frequency
bands of 500 KHz and above 2 MHz, respectively [1], [2].
The former remains the main enabler of numerous smart grid
applications and hence it will be the main focus of this paper.
Although it can be argued that PLC channels pose a
more hostile medium, compared to the wireless counterparts,
due to several inherent impairments, such as, impedance
mismatching and non-Gaussian noise, the two channels have
many similarities such as frequency selective fading and path
loss. Moreover, the broadcast nature of these links allows
different users to share the same channel, hence confiden-
tial messages become susceptible to eavesdropping [3], [4].
Such commonalities have encouraged researchers in
the PLC community to build on many wireless-based
advances for PLC systems including multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) schemes [5], [6], MAC protocols, cryptogra-
phy [7], as well as relaying and cooperative
techniques, [8]–[11]. For instance, distributed space-time
coding, as well as decode and forward relaying over PLC
channels were studied in [12] and [13]. Also, cooperative
multi-hop transmission has been applied for PLC in [14]
and [15]. Recently, physical layer security techniques, have
also been considered for PLC. The physical layer security
is primarily characterized by the secrecy capacity metric,
which is defined as the maximum transmission rate that can
be achieved without leaking information to an eavesdropper
[16], [17]. The authors in [18] and [19] considered physical
layer security for a single-input single-output PLC system
and compared its performance with the wireless counterpart.
Motivated by this, the authors of [20] were the first to extend
such idea to MIMO PLC networks and managed to demon-
strate that multi-conductor PLC networks can be manipulated
to provide more secure communications in comparison to
the single-conductor case. In addition, in order to enhance
the system security cooperative jamming technique has been
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widely considered in wireless communications. In [21],
several cooperation strategies have been proposed and the
corresponding achievable performance bounds were derived;
in this work the novel noise-forwarding (NF) strategy was
proposed, where the relay node sends codewords indepen-
dent of the source message to confuse the eavesdropper.
Different relaying schemes were studied in [22] and [23] to
maximize the secrecy capacity, while minimizing the total
transmit power. The authors in [24], exploited physical layer
security to provide secure cooperative communication for
wireless networks, where security enhancement was achieved
by cooperative relaying and cooperative jamming.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing work has
considered physical layer security in cooperative PLC sys-
tems. Thus, in this paper we focus on investigating the
performance of PLC physical layer security with amplify-
and-forward (AF) relaying and cooperative jamming over
correlated channels and provide accurate results in terms of
the average secrecy capacity and outage probability. To seek
further security improvements, we extend this work by
exploring the impact of joint PLC/wireless coding diversity.
The results are based on the assumption that PLC channels
have Log-normal distribution as concluded in [19] and [25],
and the noise is characterized with a two-term Gaussian noise
model in which impulsive noise is modeled as a Bernoulli-
Gaussian random process [26]–[28].
In summary, the contribution of this paper is threefold.
First, we analyze the average secrecy capacity for cooperative
PLC systems, with AF relaying protocol and cooperative
jamming technique. Then, we derive an analytical expression
for the corresponding secrecy outage probability. Finally,
joint PLC/wireless coding diversity gain is analyzed in terms
of the secrecy capacity metric. Monte Carlo simulations are
included to verify the analysis.
The results reveal that the secrecy performance in the
considered system is highly dependent on the jamming power
level and relay gain. It is also found that the system security
deteriorates when the correlation between the eavesdropper
channels degrades. It is also shown that PLC/wireless diver-
sity significantly improves the average secrecy capacity of the
considered cooperative PLC system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we describe the system model under consideration.
Section III analyzes the average secrecy capacities at both
the legitimate destination and eavesdropper nodes. The
corresponding secrecy outage probability is evaluated in
Section IV and Section V is dedicated to study the secrecy
capacity of the PLC/wireless coding diversity. Numerical and
simulation results are presented and discussed in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII summarizes the paper and outlines the
main conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 depicts the system model considered in this study
which consists of one source, one AF relay node and one des-
tination node. Also, one illegitimate receiver node is assumed
FIGURE 1. Basic PLC system model with cooperative AF relaying in the
presence of an eavesdropper.
to eavesdrop the confidential messages from the relay-to-
destination link. The source-to-relay, relay-to-destination,
destination-to-relay and relay-to-eavesdropper channels are
represented by the channel coefficients hsr , hrd , hdr and
hre, respectively, all of which are modeled as correlated
log-normal random variables [25]. As mentioned in the
introduction, the noise signal consists of background and
impulsive noise modeled by the two-component mixture-
Gaussian noise model. In this model, the background compo-
nent is considered complex Gaussian whereas the impulsive
part is modeled as a Bernoulli-Gaussian random process [28].
Therefore, the additive noise samples at nodem can bewritten
as [29]
nplm = ngm + nim , (1)
where m {r, d, e}, nplm is the total noise component at node
m, ngm is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at node
mwith zeromean and variance σ 2gm, nim = bm Am whereAm is
complex white Gaussian noise at node m with mean zero and
variance σ 2im, and bm is the Bernoulli process with parameter
pm and its probability mass function is given by
Pr (bm = 1) = pm,
Pr (bm = 0) = 1− pm, (2)
where pm denotes the impulsive noise probability of occur-
rence at node m. The variances σ 2gm and σ
2
im denote the back-
ground and impulsive noise power which basically define
the input signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and signal-to-impulsive
noise ratio (SINR) as SNR = 10 log10
(
1/σ 2gm
)
and SINR =
10 log10
(
1/σ 2im
)
, respectively. This system model with inde-
pendent log-normal channels and only Gaussian noise is
considered in our previous work [30].
The overall secure source-to-destination transmission is
accomplished over two phases referred to as phase I and
phase II. During phase I, the source transmits its signal to
the relay while the legitimate receiver transmits the artificial
noise signal. In phase II, the relay combines and amplifies the
two received signals and forwards it to the destination. Since
the legitimate receiver has perfect knowledge of the artificial
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G =
(
Pr
PsE
(
A (d1, f )2 |hsr |2
)+ PnE (A (d2, f )2 |hdr |2)+ σ 2r
) 1
2
. (5)
γe = Ps A (d1, f )
2 A (d3, f )2 |hsr |2 |hre|2 G2
Pn A (d2, f )2 A (d3, f )2 |hdr |2 |hre|2 G2 + σ 2r A (d3, f )2 |hre|2 G2 + σ 2e
. (9)
noise, this noise can be removed at the legitimate receiver but
not at the eavesdropper node.
To elaborate, the received signal at the relay, at a given
frequency, in the first phase can be expressed as
yr =
√
Ps A (d1, f ) hsr s+
√
Pn A (d2, f ) hdr n+ nr , (3)
where Ps is the transmitted source power, A (d1, f ) is the the
power line attenuation, s is the information signal normalized
as E
[|s|2] = 1, Pn is the artificial noise power, n is the
artificial noise signal E
[|n|2] = 1, and nr is the noise at the
relay with variance σ 2r .
In phase II, the received signal at the destination node at a
given frequency can be written as
yd =
√
Ps A (d1, f )A (d2, f ) hsr hrd G s
+√Pn A (d2, f )A (d2, f ) hdr hrd Gn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artificial Noise
+ nr A (d2, f ) hrd G+ nd , (4)
where nd is the noise at the destination with variance σ 2d
and G is the relay gain which can be considered either
constant or variable as a function of the network channel
coefficients. For simplicity, however, in this paper we assume
a constant relay gain as given by (5), shown at the top of this
page, where |.| is the absolute value operator [31].
In this paper we assume that the destination has full state
information of the main channel. Therefore, the second term
in (4) can be removed and hence yd can now be simplified as
yd =
√
Ps A (d1, f )A (d2, f ) hsr hrd G s︸ ︷︷ ︸
Signal Part
+ nr A (d2, f ) hrd G+ n¯d︸ ︷︷ ︸
Overall Noise
, (6)
where n¯d = nd + nrs and nrs is the residual artificial
noise resulting from imperfect cancellation of the artificial
noise part at the destination, with variance σ 2rs. Similarly, the
received signal at the eavesdropper end in phase II at a given
frequency can be written as
ye
= √Ps A (d1, f )A (d3, f )Ghsr hre s︸ ︷︷ ︸
Signal Part
+√PnA(d2, f )A(d3, f )Ghdrhren+ A(d3, f )Ghrenr + ne︸ ︷︷ ︸
Overall Noise
,
(7)
where ne is the noise at the eavesdropper with variance σ 2e .
From (6) and (7), after some algebraic manipulations, we can
write the SNR at the destination and eavesdropper nodes,
respectively, as in (8) and (9), shown at the top of this page.
γd = Ps A (d1, f )
2 A (d2, f )2 |hsr |2 |hrd |2 G2
σ 2r A (d2, f )
2 |hrd |2 G2 + σ¯ 2d
, (8)
where σ¯ 2d = σ 2d + σ 2rs.
III. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
It is known that the secrecy capacity, Cs, is given by the max-
imum difference between the mutual information of the main
and eavesdropper channels as follows [32], [33]. Assuming
that the channel state information is unknown at the transmit-
ter, the average secrecy capacity in this case can be obtained
as [33, p. 4692] [34, eq. (4)],
C¯s = [E [Cd ]− E [Ce]]+ , (10)
where [l]+= max (0, l), Cd and Ce are the destination and
eavesdropper capacities, respectively. Full derivation of the
average secrecy capacity expressions in different scenarios
are provided in [32] and [33].
In order to simplify the analysis of the average secrecy
capacity over the impulsive noise PLC channel, we consider
the upper bound under the assumption that full knowledge of
the noise state is available at the nodes. In this case with direct
source to destination transmission, the channel capacity (in
bits/sec/Hz) can be expressed by [30, eq. (35)] and [35]–[38]
Cd =
1∑
j=0
pj log2
(
1+ γdj
)
, (11)
where p0 = (1− pd ) , p1 = pd , γd0 is the instantaneous SNR
under only AWGN and γd1 is the instantaneous SNR under
both AWGN and impulsive noises. Therefore, with perfect
knowledge of the noise states, (11) can be interpreted as the
average of the capacities of two channels, one channel under
only the AWGN with fraction (1 − pd ), and the other under
both AWGN and impulsive noises with fraction pd .
In the relaying systems, each link (S-R, R-D) can either
face impulsive noise and background noise or only back-
ground noise. Therefore, there are four possible sates of the
additive noise at each node as shown in the table 1.
From this definition, it is clear that for one hop relay
system, the capacity can be written as a sum of four
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TABLE 1. Possible cases of the noises at the system nodes.
terms as
Cd
= 1
2
(
pr,0pd,0 log2
(
1+ γd0,0
)+ pr,0pd,1 log2 (1+ γd0,1)
+ pr,1pd,0 log2
(
1+ γd1,0
)+ pr,1pd,1 log2 (1+ γd1,1)),
(12)
where γd0,0 is the instantaneous end-to-end SNR under only
AWGN in S-R and R-D links, γd0,1 is the instantaneous end-
to-end SNR under only AWGN in S-R link and both AWGN
and impulsive noises in R-D link, γd1,0 is the instantaneous
SNR under both AWGN and impulsive noises in S-R link and
only AWGN in R-D link, γd1,1 is the instantaneous SNR under
both AWGN and impulsive noises in S-R and R-D links,
pr,0 = (1− pr ), pr,1 = pr , pd,0 = (1− pd ) and pd,1 = pd .,
pr,0 = (1− pr ), pr,1 = pr , pd,0 = (1− pd ) and pd,1 = pd .
The capacity in (12) can also be written as
Cd = 12
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
pr,ipd,j log2
(
1+ γdi,j
)
. (13)
The factor 12 is due to the fact that two time slots are
required for transmitter-to-receiver data transmission. Now,
in order to find the average secrecy capacity C¯s, we need to
calculate the average destination capacity C¯d and the average
eavesdropper capacity C¯e.
A. AVERAGE DESTINATION CAPACITY
To find the average capacity at the destination, it is more
convenient to rewrite γd in (8) as
γdi,j =
X
Yi +Wj , (14)
where X = Ps A (d1, f )2 A (d2, f )2 |hsr |2 G2, Yi =
σ 2r,i A (d2, f )
2 G2 and Wj = σ¯
2
d,j
|hrd |2 . Hence from (13) ,
the capacity at the destination Cd can now be expressed as
Cd = 12
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
pr,ipd,j log2
(
1+ X
Yi +Wj
)
. (15)
Lemma 1: It is found in [39] that for any u, v > 0
E
[
ln
(
1+ u
v
)]
=
∞∫
0
1
z
(Mv (z)−Mv,u (z)) dz, (16)
where Mv (z) denotes the moment generating func-
tion (MGF) of v andMv,u (z) is the MGF of (v+ u).
Using the definition in (16), and since X and W are corre-
lated, the destination average capacity can be obtained as
E [Cd ] = 12 ln (2)
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
pr,ipd,j
×
∞∫
0
1
z
(MYi,Wj (z)−MX ,Yi,Wj (z)) dz, (17)
where MYi,Wj (z) and MX ,Yi,Wj (z) are the MGFs of the
variables Yi +Wj and X + Yi +Wj, respectively. Now, since
Y is constant, the MGF of Yi +Wj can be written as [40]
MYi,Wj (z) =MYi (z)MWj (z) , (18)
where
MYi (z) = e−z σ
2
r,i A(d2,f )
2G2
. (19)
and
MWj (z) =M 1|hrd |2
(
σ¯ 2d,j z
)
, (20)
M( K∑
k=1
ΩkYk
) (z) ' Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
....
Np∑
nK=1
(
K∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
× exp
− K∑
k=1
zΩk exp
√2 K∑
=1
ck xn + µk
+ RN . (23)
MYi Wj (z) '
MYi (z)√
pi
Np∑
i=1
Hxiexp
(
10
−√22σhrd xi+−
(
2µhrd
)
10 σ¯ 2d,j z
)
. (24)
MX ,Wj,Yi (z) 'MYi (z)
Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
(
2∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
× exp
− 2∑
k=1
zΩk exp
√2 2∑
=1
ck xn + µk
 . (25)
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where σ¯ 2d,j = σ 2d,j + σ 2rs. Similarly, because X and Wj are
correlated, the MGF of X + Yi+Wj can be expressed as [40]
MX ,Yi,Wj (z) =MYi (z)MX ,Wj (z) . (21)
As the PLC channel is generally represented with log-
normal distribution [18], the MGF of channel (h) is [41,
eq. (2.28)]
Mh (z) ' 1√
pi
Np∑
i=1
Hxiexp
(
10
√
2σhxi+µh
10 z
)
, (22)
where Hxi and xi are the weight factors and zeros of the
Np−order Hermite polynomial, respectively, and µh, σhare
the mean and the standard deviation of the channel h.
Furthermore, the MGF of K lognormal correlated channels
are given by (23), shown at the bottom of the previous
page, [42], [43], whereΩk is arbitrary non negative constants,
ck is the (k. )th element of the square root of the correlation
matrix RM , i.e elements of Rsqwhere RM = RsqR†sq, and the
reminder RN is sufficiently small when Np > 10 [42], [43].
Using these definitions, for |hsr |2 d∼ lognormal(
2µhsr , 4σ
2
hsr
)
and 1|hrd |2
d∼ lognormal
(
−2µhrd , 4σ 2hrd
)
,
we can express the MGFs of Wj + Yi and X + Wj + Yi,
respectively, as in (24) and (25), shown at the bottom of the
previous page, where 1 = Ps A (d1, f )2 A (d2, f )2 |hsr |2 G2
and 2 = σ¯ 2d,j.
Finally, the average capacity at the destination can be
obtained by simply substituting (24) and (25) into (17).
B. AVERAGE EAVESDROPPER CAPACITY
Similarly as in the previous section, the average capacity at
the eavesdropper can be derived here. We begin by rewrit-
ing (9) as
γei,l =
χ
S + ϒi + Cl , (26)
where χ = Ps A (d1, f )2 A (d3, f )2 |hsr |2 G2, S = Pn
A (d2, f )2 A (d3, f )2 |hdr |2 G2, ϒi = σ 2r,i A (d3, f )2 G2 and
Cl = σ
2
e,l
|hre|2 . Now, using (13) and (16) and based on the fact
that χ , S and C are correlated, the average capacity at the
eavesdropper can be expressed as
E [Ce] = 12 ln (2)
1∑
i=0
1∑
l=0
pr,i pe,l
×
∞∫
0
1
z
(MS, ϒi,Cl (z)−Mχ,S, ϒi,Cl (z)) dz, (27)
where pe,0 = (1− pe) , pe,1 = pe. TheMS, ϒi,Cl (z) can be
given by
MS, ϒi,Cl (z) =Mϒi (z)MS,Cl (z) , (28)
where
Mϒi (z) = e−z σ
2
r,i A(d3,f )
2G2
, (29)
As in (25),MS, ϒi,Cl (z) can be given by
MS, ϒi,Cl (z)
'Mϒi (z)
Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
(
2∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
× exp
− 2∑
k=1
zΩk exp
√2 2∑
=1
ck xn + µk
 , (30)
where 1 = Pn A (d2, f )2 A (d3, f )2 G2, 2 = σ 2e,l , σ 2e,0 =
σ 2ge and σ
2
e,1 = σ 2ge + σ 2ie. Similarly, theMχ,S, ϒi,Cl (z) can
be written as
Mχ,S, ϒi,Cl (z) = Mϒi (z)Mχ,S,Cl (z) , (31)
where
Mχ,S,Cl (z)
=
Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
Np∑
n3=1
(
3∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
× exp
− 3∑
k=1
zΩk exp
√2 3∑
=1
ck xn + µk
 , (32)
while 3 = Ps A (d1, f )2 A (d3, f )2 G2.
E [Cd ] ≈
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
pr,ipd,j
1
2 ln (2)Yi
n∑
=1
ω
Yi
z
(
1√
pi
Np∑
i=1
Hxiexp
(
10
−√22σhrd xi+−
(
2µhrd
)
10
σ¯ 2d,j z
Yi
)
−
Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
(
2∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
(33)
× exp
− 2∑
k=1
zΩk
Yi
exp
√2 2∑
=1
ck xn + µk
).
E [Ce] ≈
1∑
i=0
1∑
l=0
pr,i pe,l
1
2 ln (2)ϒi
n∑
=1
ω
ϒi
z
( Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
(
2∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
× exp
− 2∑
k=1
zΩk
ϒi
exp
√2 2∑
=1
ck xn + µk

−
Np∑
n1=1
Np∑
n2=1
Np∑
n3=1
(
3∏
k=1
Hnk√
pi
)
× exp
− 3∑
k=1
zΩk
ϒi
Ωk exp
√2 3∑
=1
ck xn + µk
). (34)
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Pout = Pr
1
2
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
pr,ipd,j log2
(
1+ γdi,j
)− 1
2
1∑
i=0
1∑
l=0
pr,i pe,l log2
(
1+ γei,l
) < R
 . (36)
Pout = 1− Pr
[
X >
υ − 1
1
W+Y − υ ΘC+Y Θ+S
| C = c, S = s,W = w
]
. (41)
F¯X (r) = 1− 12
(
1+ erf
(
ln (r)− (2µhsr + ln (PsA (d1, f )2 A (d2, f )2 G2r ))
2σhsr
√
2
))
. (44)
f (s, c,w) =
exp
(
−
(
1
2
)
(ln (h)− µh)T K−1h (ln (h)− µh)
)
(2pi)
3
2 |Kh| 12
3∏
l=1
hl
. (45)
Now by substituting (30) and (31) into (27), we get
the average eavesdropper capacity. Finally, substituting (17)
and (27) into (10) yields the average secrecy capacity of the
proposed system.
According to the best of the authors knowledge, these
expressions of E [Cd ] and E [Ce] are the simplest expres-
sions for the average capacities. Furthermore, to more
clearly highlight the effect of various system parameters,
Gaussian Quadrature rule can be straightforwardly applied.
For instance we can write (17) and (27) as in (33) and (34),
respectively, shown at the bottom of the previous page,
where z and ω are the th abscissa and weight, respec-
tively, of the nth order Laguerre polynomial, tabulated in
[44, eq. (25 .4 .45)].
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability is defined basically as the
probability that the secrecy capacity falls below a certain
threshold value, R, and can be mathematically given as
Pout = Pr [Cs < R] . (35)
The secrecy outage probability can be written as in (36),
as shown at the top of this page.
It should be stressed that the secrecy outage in this work
means that in an ensemble of networks we do not offer a
certain secrecy rate. In this section, for simplicity we assume
that, the source relay channel hsr is independent of the other
channels, as adopted in [29] and [37]. In addition, in order to
make the analysis clearer we study one case, when there is no
impulsive noise.1 Therefore,
Pout = Pr
[
1+ γd
1+ γe < υ
]
= Pr [γd − υγe < υ − 1] , (37)
1Numerical results for the exact secrecy outage probability will be pre-
sented in the numerical results section.
where υ = 22R. Substituting (14) and (26) into (37) yields
Pout = Pr
[
X
Y +W −
υ χ
C + ϒ + S < υ − 1
]
. (38)
By substituting χ = XΘ and Υ = YΘ , where Θ =(
A(d3,f )2
A(d2,f )2
)
, we can write the secrecy outage probability now
as
Pout = Pr
[
X
Y +W −
υ ΘX
C + Y Θ + S < υ − 1
]
. (39)
= Pr
[
X <
υ − 1
1
W+Y − υ ΘC+Y Θ+S
]
. (40)
By conditioning onC , S andW ,Pout can be written as in (41),
as shown at the top of this page, which can also be expressed
as
Pout = 1−
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
F¯X (r) f (s, c,w) ds dc dw, (42)
where F¯X (.) is the complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) of the random variable X , f (s, c,w), is the
joint PDF and
r = υ − 11
w+Y − υ Θc+Y Θ+s
. (43)
Since X , S, C and W have log-normal distributions,
i. e., X
d∼ lognormal(2µhsr+ ln(PsA (d1, f )2 A(d2, f )2G2r),
4σ 2hsr
)
, S
d∼lognormal(2µhrd+ ln(PnA (d2, f )2 A (d3, f )2 G2r),
4σ 2hrd
)
, C
d∼ lognormal (−2µhre+ ln (σ 2e ) , 4σ 2hre) , and
W
d∼ lognormal (−2µhrd+ ln (σ 2d ) , 4σ 2hrd), the CCDF
of X and the joint PDF f (s, c,w) can be written as
in (44) and (45), as shown at the top of this page, respectively
[37], [45], [46], where h = [S,C,W ]T , µh is the mean
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Pout = 1−
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
1− 12
1+ erf

ln
(
υ−1
1
δ
S +Y
− υ Θc+Y Θ+s
)
− (2µhsr + ln (PsA (d1, f )2 A (d2, f )2 G2r ))
2σhsr
√
2



×
 1
2piσsσc s c
√(
1− ρ2) × exp
(
−A
2 + B2 − 2ρAB
2
(
1− ρ2)
) ds dc. (48)
Pout ≈ 1−
m∑
ϕ=1
n∑
=1
ωϕω
1−
1
2
1+ erf

ln
 υ−1
1
δ
Sϕ
+Y −
υ Θ
c+Y Θ+sϕ
− (2µhsr + ln (PsA (d1, f )2 A (d2, f )2 G2r ))
2σhsr
√
2



×
 esϕ+c
2piσsσc sϕ c
√(
1− ρ2) × exp
−
(
(ln(sϕ)−µs)
σs
)2 + ( (ln(c)−µc)
σc
)2 − 2ρ ( (ln(sϕ)−µs)
σs
) (
(ln(c)−µc)
σc
)
2
(
1− ρ2)

 . (49)
vector µh = [µs, µc, µw]T , Kh is the covariance matrix and
|Kh| is the the determinant of Kh.
In case hdr and hrd are fully correlated, we can useW = δS
where δ = σ¯ 2d Pn A (d2, f )2 A (d3, f )2 G2. As a consequence,
the integration in (42) reduces into double integration
Pout = 1−
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
F¯X (r) f (s, c) ds dc. (46)
and the joint PDF f (s, c) can now be written as
f (s, c) = 1
2piσsσc s c
√(
1− ρ2)
× exp
(
−A
2 + B2 − 2ρAB
2
(
1− ρ2)
)
, (47)
where A = (ln (s)− µs) /σs, B = (ln (c)− µc) /σc, while
µ and σ 2 are the mean and the variance of the natural loga-
rithm of S and C and ρ is the correlation factor. Substituting
(44) and (47) into (46) we can find the secrecy outage proba-
bility in this case as in (48).
Similarly, in order to get a simple closed form for the
secrecy outage probability, Quadrature rule can be straight-
forward applied, as in (49), where
(
sϕ, c
)
and
(
ωϕ, ω
)
are
the ϕth, th abscissa and weights of the Laguerre polynomial.
Generally, we found that the secrecy performance of the
proposed system above is still somewhat limited (see the
numerical results section). Therefore, we look at ways to
further improve the secrecy of the proposed system. One way
of doing this is by considering PLC/wireless diversity which
is going to be discussed next.
V. PLC/WIRELESS DIVERSITY
It is known that the utilization of parallel PLC and wireless
links can considerably enhance the network capacity, this
scheme is considered in the literature, for instance [47]–[49].
PLC/wireless diversity provides two links, PLC and wireless;
increasing the number of communication links enhances the
system performance since only the eavesdropper receives
jamming signals through the two links, while the destina-
tion does not. Therefore, in this section we analyze the
secrecy capacity of such networks with the objective to
achieve efficient use of parallel transmission channels. The
considered coding diversity for PLC/wireless transmission
is shown in Fig. 2 where the output of the encoder is
de-multiplexed and then transmitted over different channels.
Therefore, the source transmits two signals over two inde-
pendent links, PLC and wireless. Cooperative diversity gains
over Rayleigh and Log-normal channels considered in details
in [50]–[52].
In this configuration, the capacity at the destination and the
eavesdropper can be given, respectively, as [47], [48]
Cd = C {w}d + C {p}d , (50)
Ce = C {w}e + C {p}e , (51)
where the superscripts {w} and {p} denote the capacities for
the wireless and PLC links, respectively. Therefore, the aver-
age secrecy capacity can now be simply written as
E [Cs] =
[
E
[
C {w}d + C {p}d
]
− E
[
C {w}e + C {p}e
]]+
. (52)
E
[
C {p}d
]
and E
[
C {p}e
]
are already calculated in the previ-
ous section. Now, using a similar procedure, we can derive
E
[
C {w}d
]
and E
[
C {w}e
]
as shown below.
VOLUME 5, 2017 13915
A. Salem et al.: Physical Layer Security Over Correlated Log-Normal Cooperative PLC Channels
FIGURE 2. Architecture of PLC/wireless coding diversity with cooperative relaying.
A. WIRELESS AVERAGE DESTINATION CAPACITY
The average capacity at the destination for the wireless
link also can be found by using (14) and (16) when
X = Ps |hsr |2 G2, Y = σ 2r G2dm1 and W = σ¯ 2d dm1 dm2
/ |hrd |2 and m is the wireless path loss exponent. In addition,
the channels coefficients between the nodes are now complex
Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance, i.e. CN (0, 1).
Therefore, |hrd |2 and |hsr |2 have exponential distributions
with parameters λhrd and λhsr , respectively. With this in mind,
we obtain [39], [53]
E
[
C {w}d
]
= 1
2 ln (2)
∞∫
0
1
z
(MY ,W (z)−MX ,Y ,W (z)) dz.
(53)
In this case the MGFs of W and X are given by
MW (z)=2
√
λhrdσ
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z K1
(
2
√
λhrdσ
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
)
. (54)
and
MX (z) = λhsr
λhsr + PsG2z
. (55)
where KN (.) is the N th order modified Bessel function of
the second kind [54], then we can find MY ,W (z) and
MX ,Y ,W (z) for the wireless system as given by (56)
and (57), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Finally, the wireless average capacity at the destination can
be obtained by simply substituting (56) and (57) into (53), as
in (58), as shown at the bottom of this page.
B. WIRELESS AVERAGE EAVESDROPPER CAPACITY
For the wireless average capacity at the eavesdropper, it can
be found from (26) and (16) where χ = Ps |hsr |2 G2dm2 ,
S = Pn |hdr |2 G2dm1 , ϒ = σ 2r G2dm1 dm2 and C = σ 2e dm1 dm2 dm3
/ |hre|2. In this case,
E
[
C {w}e
]
= 1
2 ln (2)
∞∫
0
1
z
(
1−Mχ (z)
)MS, ϒ,C (z) dz,
(59)
whereMχ (z) andMS, ϒ,C (z) are given respectively by (60)
and (61), respectively
Mχ (z) = λhsr
λhsr + PsG2dm2 z
. (60)
Now, by substituting (60) and (61) into (59), we can get the
wireless average eavesdropper capacity as in (62).
According to the best of the authors knowledge, these
expressions of E
[
C {w}d
]
and E
[
C {w}e
]
are the simplest
MY ,W (z) = 2 exp (−z Y )
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z K1
(
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
)
. (56)
MX ,Y ,W (z) = 2 exp (−z Y ) λhsr
λhsr + PsG2z
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z K1
(
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
)
. (57)
E
[
C {w}d
]
= 1
2 ln (2)
∞∫
0
1
z
(
2 exp (−z Y )
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z K1
(
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
)
− 2 exp (−z Y ) λhsr
λhsr + PsG2z
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z K1
(
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
))
dz. (58)
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expressions for the wireless average capacities; in order to
more clearly highlight the effect of various system param-
eters, Gaussian Quadrature rule can be straightforwardly
applied as in (63) and (64) , respectively, where z and ω
are the th abscissa and weight, respectively, of the nth order
Laguerre polynomial, tabulated in [44, eq. (25 .4 .45)].
Finally, substituting the PLC and wireless average capac-
ities into (52) yields the overall average secrecy capacity of
the proposed PLC/wireless system.
A MIMO-PLC scheme can also be employed to further
improve the security of PLC systems. The cooperative jam-
ming technique proposed in this paper for SISO system can be
extended for the MIMO case where each legitimate receiver
transmits different jamming signal over its channel (wire) in
the first cooperative phase, and in the second phase all the
legitimate receivers can cancel out the self back-interference,
taking into account the high degree of correlation among the
channels.2
Below we present and discuss some numerical examples
for the derived expressions above.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for the average
secrecy capacity and the outage probability.Monte Carlo sim-
ulations are also provided to verify our analysis. The correla-
tion between the channels is shown to follow the exponential
model [46]. Therefore, the covariance matrix is given by
K =

1 ρ .......... ρL−1
ρ 1 .......... ρL−2
.. .. .......... ...
ρL−1 ρL−2 ........... 1
 . (65)
where L number of the correlated channels. In addition, in
order to characterize the power line attenuation, we adopt
the model reported in [4] in which attenuation increases
exponentially with distance, given by exp (−α d), where
α = ao + a1 f k is the attenuation factor, ao and a1 are con-
stants determined from measurements, f is the frequency and
k denotes the exponent of the attenuation factor. The system
parameters adopted here, unless clearly stated otherwise, are
as follows: k = 0.7, f = 500KHz [4], [37], [46]. Further-
more, for fairness sake, the impulsive noise probability of
2The security in MIMO-PLC systems will be investigated in future work.
occurrence at all the nodes are equal (p) and all the channels
have zero mean and unit variance.
FIGURE 3. A 3D surface plot for the average secrecy capacity as a
function of the artificial noise power and relay gain (circles represent
simulated results).
A. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
In this subsection, we examine the average secrecy capacity
of the proposed system. In order to illustrate the impact of
the artificial noise power and the relay gain on the system
security, we present in Fig. 3 a 3D surface plot for the
average secrecy capacity versus Pn and G when the input
SNR = 25 dB, SINR = −10 dB, p = 0.001, Ps =
−3 dBW, σ 2rs = −30 dBW, ρ = 0.6, a0 = −2.03 × 10−3,
a1 = 3.75 × 10−7 and d1 = d2 = d3 = 10m. It is
obvious that the analytical results, obtained from (10), and
the simulated ones are matching. As anticipated, it can be
seen that the system secrecy capacity enhances significantly
with increasing the jamming signal power and/or the relay
gain. It is also worthwhile highlighting that the absence of the
artificial noise, leads to zero secrecy capacity. This is justified
by the fact that when there is no artificial noise, Cd will be
less than or equal to Ce, which consequently results in zero
secrecy capacity.
Now, to explore the impact of the correlation factor ρ
on the system performance, the average secrecy capacity is
plotted in Fig. 4 with respect to the input SNR for ρ =
0.3, 0.6 and 0.9 when Ps = −3 dBW, Pn = −3 dBW,
MS, ϒ,C (z) = 2 exp (−zϒ) λhdr
λhdr + PnG2dm1 z
√
λhreσ
2
e d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
3 z K1
(
2
√
λhreσ
2
e d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
3 z
)
. (61)
E
[
C {w}e
]
= 1
2 ln (2)
∞∫
0
1
z
(
1− λhsr
λhsr + PsG2dm2 z
)
× 2 exp (−zϒ) λhdr
λhdr + PnG2dm1 z
√
λhreσ
2
e d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
3 z K1
(
2
√
λhreσ
2
e d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
3 z
)
dz. (62)
VOLUME 5, 2017 13917
A. Salem et al.: Physical Layer Security Over Correlated Log-Normal Cooperative PLC Channels
FIGURE 4. Average secrecy capacity as a function of the input SNR for
various alues of ρ when p = 0.1 and 0.001.
SINR = −10 dB, σ 2rs = −30 dBW, G = 1 and d1 =
d2 = d3 = 10m when p = 0.001 and 0.1. As anticipated,
we can see the intuitive result that increasing the input SNR
implies enhancing the secrecy capacity. However, the system
can always be made more secure with increasing the corre-
lation factor ρ. This is because, there is no impact from the
correlation on the signal to noise ratio at the destination and
the average capacity at the destination is almost equal for each
value of ρ, which is not the case at the eavesdropper; hence
the lowest correlation factor gives highest capacity.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this subsection, we present some numerical examples for
the secrecy outage probability expression derived above for
the PLC-alone system. The exact and the approximation
results of the probability are shown in Fig. 5 as a function
of the threshold values of the secrecy rate, R, for different
values of the source power. The power line channel fea-
tures adopted in this investigation are a0 = −2.03 × 10−3,
a1 = 3.75 × 10−7, k = 0.7 and the noise values are chosen
as Pn = −3 dBW, input SNR = 25 dB, SINR = −15 and
FIGURE 5. Secrecy outage probability versus threshold values for
different values of Ps.
σ 2rs = −30 dBW, when d1 = d2 = d3 = 10m, ρ = 0.6,
p = 0.01 and G = 1. The one important observation that can
be seen from this figure is that increasing the source power
will always reduce the secrecy outage probability.
C. SOURCE POWER, EAVESDROPPER LOCATION
AND CODING DIVERSITY
We now examine the effect of the PLC/wireless coding
diversity, source power and the eavesdropper location on the
average secrecy capacity of the proposed systems. Fig. 6
illustrates the average secrecy capacity of the PLC/wireless
and PLC-alone systems as a function of the source power
Ps for different values of the distance between the relay and
the eavesdropper d3. The results in this subsection are based
on the following Pn = −7 dBW, G = 1, d1 = d2 =
100m and the cable attenuation parameters for the power line
channel are a0 = 9.4 × 10−3, a1 = 4.2 × 10−7 and
k = 0.7 [4]. It is interesting to note that the average
secrecy capacity of the PLC/wireless system has always
better performance than that of the PLC-alone scheme and
this enhancement becomes more pronounced as Ps becomes
E
[
C {w}d
]
≈ 1
2 ln (2)Y
n∑
=1
ω
Y
z
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
Y
K1
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
Y

− 2Yλhsr
λhsrY + PsG2z
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
Y
K1
2
√
λhrd σ¯
2
d d
m
1 d
m
2 z
Y
 dz. (63)
E
[
C {w}e
]
≈ 1
2 ln (2)
n∑
=1
ω
ϒ
z
(
1− λhsrϒ
λhsrϒ + PsG2dm2 z
)
× 2ϒλhdr
λhdrϒ + PnG2dm1 z
√
λhreσ
2
e d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
3 z
ϒ
K1
2
√
λhreσ
2
e d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
3 z
ϒ
 dz. (64)
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FIGURE 6. Average secrecy capacity versus source power for PLC/wireless and PLC-alone systems. (a) Average secrecy capacity versus source power for
PLC/wireless system. (b) Average secrecy capacity versus source power for PLC-alone system.
larger. We can see clearly the secrecy gain provided by the
PLC/wireless scheme; for instance, at Ps = 0 dBW , there is
about a 0.6 bits/s/Hz secrecy capacity gain when d3 = 200m
and becomes around 0.5 bits/s/Hz for d3 = 100m. In addition,
it is evident that when the eavesdropper becomes closer to
the relay, the system becomes less secure in both schemes;
however, the system security improves as the eavesdropper
moves away from the relay.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the application of physical layer
security in cooperative PLC networks employing a jamming
technique for protection against eavesdroppers. We analyzed
the system performance in terms of the average secrecy
capacity and secrecy outage probability for various system set
ups, including PLC/wireless diversity coding. The accuracy
of the analytical results was validated with Monte Carlo sim-
ulations. The results provided an insight into the relationship
between the secrecy performance of cooperative PLC sys-
tems, artificial noise power, relay gain and correlation factor,
as well as PLC/wireless coding diversity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank our colleagues and the
anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions and
comments which greatly improved our paper. They would
also like to thank the editor for his professional advice and
handling of the reviewing process.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Galli, A. Scaglione, and Z. Wang, ‘‘For the grid and through the grid:
The role of power line communications in the smart grid,’’ Proc. IEEE,
vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 998–1027, Sep. 2011.
[2] M. Nassar, J. Lin, Y. Mortazavi, A. Dabak, I. H. Kim, and B. Evans,
‘‘Local utility power line communications in the 3–500 khz band: Channel
impairments, noise, and standards,’’ IEEE Signal Process. Mag., vol. 29,
no. 5, pp. 116–127, Sep. 2012.
[3] D. Anastasiadou and T. Antonakopoulos, ‘‘Multipath characterization of
indoor power-line networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 20, no. 1,
pp. 90–99, Jan. 2005.
[4] M. Zimmermann and K. Dostert, ‘‘A multipath model for the powerline
channel,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 553–559, Apr. 2002.
[5] A. Schwager, D. Schneider, W. Baschlin, A. Dilly, and J. Speidel, ‘‘MIMO
PLC: Theory, measurements and system setup,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
Power Line Commun. Appl. (ISPLC), Apr. 2011, pp. 48–53.
[6] D. Rende et al., ‘‘Noise correlation and its effect on capacity of inhome
MIMO power line channels,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Power Line Com-
mun. Its Appl. (ISPLC), Apr. 2011, pp. 60–65.
[7] R. Newman, L. Yonge, S. Gavette, and R. Anderson, ‘‘Homeplug AV
security mechanisms,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Power Line Commun. Its
Appl. (ISPLC), Mar. 2007, pp. 366–371.
[8] X. Cheng, R. Cao, and L. Yang, ‘‘Relay-aided amplify-and-forward power-
line communications,’’ IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 265–272,
Mar. 2013.
[9] L. Lampe and A. Vinck, ‘‘Cooperative multihop power line communica-
tions,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Power Line Commun. Appl. (ISPLC),
Mar. 2012, pp. 1–6.
[10] M. Noori and L. Lampe, ‘‘Improving data rate in relay-aided power line
communications using network coding,’’ in Proc. IEEE Global Commun.
Conf. (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2013, pp. 2975–2980.
[11] S. D’Alessandro and A. M. Tonello, ‘‘On rate improvements and power
saving with opportunistic relaying in home power line networks,’’
EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process., vol. 2012, pp. 1–17, Sep. 2012.
[12] L. Lampe, R. Schober, and S. Yiu, ‘‘Distributed space-time coding for
multihop transmission in power line communication networks,’’ IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 24, no. 7, pp. 1389–1400, Jul. 2006.
[13] A. Tonello, F. Versolatto, and S. D’Alessandro, ‘‘Opportunistic relay-
ing in in-home PLC networks,’’ in Proc. IEEE Global Telecommun.
Conf. (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2010, pp. 1–5.
[14] L. Lampe and A. Vinck, ‘‘On cooperative coding for narrow band PLC net-
works,’’ Int. J. Electron. Commun., vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 681–687, Aug. 2011.
[15] V. B. Balakirsky and A. J. H. Vinck, ‘‘Potential performance of PLC
systems composed of several communication links,’’ in Proc. Int. Symp.
Power Line Commun. Appl., Apr. 2005, pp. 12–16.
[16] A. D. Wyner, ‘‘The wire-tap channel,’’ Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[17] I. Csiszár and J. Korner, ‘‘Broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348,
May 1978.
[18] A. Pittolo and A. Tonello, ‘‘Physical layer security in PLC networks:
Achievable secrecy rate and channel effects,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
Power Line Commun. Appl. (ISPLC), Mar. 2013, pp. 273–278.
VOLUME 5, 2017 13919
A. Salem et al.: Physical Layer Security Over Correlated Log-Normal Cooperative PLC Channels
[19] A. Pittolo and A. Tonello, ‘‘Physical layer security in power line com-
munication networks: An emerging scenario, other than wireless,’’ IET
Commun., vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1239–1247, May 2014.
[20] Y. Zhuang and L. Lampe, ‘‘Physical layer security in MIMO power line
communication networks,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Power Line Commun.
Appl. (ISPLC), Mar. 2014, pp. 272–277.
[21] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, ‘‘The relay–eavesdropper channel: Cooperation
for secrecy,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 4005–4019,
Sep. 2008.
[22] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, ‘‘Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,’’ IEEE Trans. Signal Pro-
cess., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, Mar. 2010.
[23] J. Li, A. P. Petropulu, and S. Weber, ‘‘On cooperative relaying schemes
for wireless physical layer security,’’ IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59,
no. 10, pp. 4985–4997, Oct. 2011.
[24] B. Han, J. Li, J. Su, M. Guo, and B. Zhao, ‘‘Secrecy capacity optimization
via cooperative relaying and jamming forWANETs,’’ IEEE Trans. Parallel
Distrib. Syst., vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1117–1128, Apr. 2015.
[25] A. M. Tonello, F. Versolatto, B. Bejar, and S. Zazo, ‘‘A fitting algorithm
for random modeling the PLC channel,’’ IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 27,
no. 3, pp. 1477–1484, Jul. 2012.
[26] Y. H. Ma, P. L. So, and E. Gunawan, ‘‘Performance analysis of OFDM
systems for broadband power line communications under impulsive
noise and multipath effects,’’ IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 20, no. 2,
pp. 674–682, Apr. 2005.
[27] F. Abdelkefi, P. Duhamel, and F. Alberge, ‘‘Impulsive noise cancella-
tion in multicarrier transmission,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 53, no. 1,
pp. 94–106, Jan. 2005.
[28] M. Ghosh, ‘‘Analysis of the effect of impulse noise on multicarrier and
single carrier QAM systems,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 44, no. 2,
pp. 145–147, Feb. 1996.
[29] A. Dubey and R.Mallik, ‘‘Plc system performance with af relaying,’’ IEEE
Trans. Commun., vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 2337–2345, Jun. 2015.
[30] A. Salem, K. M. Rabie, K. A. Hamdi, E. Alsusa, and A. M. Tonello,
‘‘Physical layer security of cooperative relaying power-line communica-
tion systems,’’ in Proc. Int. Symp. Power Line Commun. Appl. (ISPLC),
Mar. 2016, pp. 185–189.
[31] M. O. Hasna and M. S. Alouini, ‘‘A performance study of dual-hop
transmissions with fixed gain relays,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 1963–1968, Nov. 2004.
[32] Y. W. P. Hong, P.-C. Lan, and C.-C. J. Kuo, Signal Processing Approaches
to Secure Physical Layer Communications in Multi-Antenna Wireless
Systems. New York, NY, USA: Springer, 2014.
[33] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, ‘‘On the secrecy capac-
ity of fading channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 10,
pp. 4687–4698, Oct. 2008.
[34] A. Salem, K. A. Hamdi, and K. M. Rabie, ‘‘Physical layer security with
RF energy harvesting in af multi-antenna relaying networks,’’ IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 64, no. 7, pp. 3025–3038, Jul. 2016.
[35] S. P. Herath, N. H. Tran, and T. Le-Ngoc, ‘‘On optimal input distribution
and capacity limit of Bernoulli–Gaussian impulsive noise channels,’’ in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC), Jun. 2012, pp. 3429–3433.
[36] H. V. Vu, N. H. Tran, T. V. Nguyen, and S. I. Hariharan, ‘‘Estimating
Shannon and constrained capacities of Bernoulli–Gaussian impulsive noise
channels in Rayleigh fading,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 62, no. 6,
pp. 1845–1856, Jun. 2014.
[37] A. Dubey, R. K. Mallik, and R. Schober, ‘‘Performance of a PLC system
in impulsive noise with selection combining,’’ in Proc. IEEE Global Com-
mun. Conf. (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2012, pp. 3508–3512.
[38] K. C.Wiklundh, P. F. Stenumgaard, and H.M. Tullberg, ‘‘Channel capacity
of Middleton’s class a interference channel,’’ Electron. Lett., vol. 45,
no. 24, pp. 1227–1229, Nov. 2009.
[39] K. A. Hamdi, ‘‘A useful lemma for capacity analysis of fading interference
channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 411–416, Feb. 2010.
[40] S. M. Ross, Introduction to Probability Models, 10th ed. Oxford, U.K.:
Elsevier, 2010.
[41] M. K. Simon and M.-S. Alouini, Digital Communication Over Fading
Channels. New York, NY, USA: Wiley, 2005.
[42] N. B. Mehta, J. Wu, A. F. Molisch, and J. Zhang, ‘‘Approximating a sum
of random variables with a lognormal,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 6, no. 7, pp. 2690–2699, Jul. 2007.
[43] K. A. Hamdi, ‘‘On the statistics of signal-to-interference plus noise ratio
in wireless communications,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 57, no. 11,
pp. 3199–3204, Nov. 2009.
[44] M. Abramowitz and I. A. Stegun, Handbook of Mathematical Functions
With Formulas, Graphs, and Mathematical Tables. New York, NY, USA:
Wiley, 1972.
[45] N. Balakrishnan and C.-D. Lai, Continuous Bivariate Distributions. New
York, NY, USA: Springer, 2009.
[46] A. Dubey, R. Mallik, and R. Schober, ‘‘Performance analysis of a power
line communication system employing selection combining in correlated
log-normal channels and impulsive noise,’’ IET Commun., vol. 8, no. 7,
pp. 1072–1082, May 2014.
[47] J. N. Laneman, E. Martinian, G. W. Wornell, and J. G. Apostolopoulos,
‘‘Source-channel diversity for parallel channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 51, no. 10, pp. 3518–3539, Oct. 2005.
[48] S. W. Lai, N. Shabehpour, G. G. Messier, and L. Lampe, ‘‘Performance
of wireless/power line media diversity in the office environment,’’ in Proc.
IEEE Global Commun. Conf. (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2014, pp. 2972–2976.
[49] M. Sayed, T. A. Tsiftsis, and N. Al-Dhahir, ‘‘On the diversity of hybrid
narrowband-PLC/wireless communications for smart grids,’’ IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 7, pp. 4344–4360, Jul. 2017.
[50] M. Safari and M. Uysal, ‘‘Cooperative diversity over log-normal fading
channels: Performance analysis and optimization,’’ IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 1963–1972, May 2008.
[51] S. Zhang, X. G. Xia, and J. Wang, ‘‘Cooperative performance and diversity
gain of wireless relay networks,’’ IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 30,
no. 10, pp. 1623–1632, Oct. 2012.
[52] R. Narasimhan, ‘‘Finite-SNR diversity–multiplexing tradeoff for corre-
lated Rayleigh and Rician MIMO channels,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 52, no. 9, pp. 3965–3979, Sep. 2006.
[53] M. O. Hasna andM.-S. Alouini, ‘‘Performance analysis of two-hop relayed
transmissions over Rayleigh fading channels,’’ in Proc. IEEE 56th Veh.
Technol. Conf. VTC Fall, vol. 4. Mar. 2002, pp. 1992–1996.
[54] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and Products.
Orlanndo, FL, USA: Academic, 1980.
ABDELHAMID SALEM (S’12) received the B.Sc.
degree in electrical and electronic engineering
and the M.Sc. degree (Hons.) in communica-
tion engineering from the University of Benghazi,
Benghazi, Libya, in 2002 and 2009, respectively.
He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in
wireless communications with The University of
Manchester, U.K. His current research interests
include physical layer security, signal process-
ing for interference mitigation, energy harvesting,
wireless power transfer, MIMO systems, wireless optical communication
systems, and power line communications.
13920 VOLUME 5, 2017
A. Salem et al.: Physical Layer Security Over Correlated Log-Normal Cooperative PLC Channels
KHAIRI ASHOUR HAMDI (M’99–SM’02)
received the B.Sc. degree in electrical engineer-
ing from Alfateh University, Tripoli, Libya, in
1981, the M.Sc. degree (Hons.) from the Technical
University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary, in
1988, and the Ph.D. degree in telecommunica-
tion engineering from the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences in 1993. His current research interests
include modeling and performance analysis of
wireless communication systems and networks,
green communication systems, and heterogeneous mobile networks.
EMAD ALSUSA (M’06–SM’07) received the
Ph.D. degree in electrical and electronic engineer-
ing from Bath University, Bath, in 2000. He then
joined the School of Engineering and Elec-
tronics, Edinburgh University, as a MobileVCE
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, where he was
involved in link enhancement techniques for future
high data rate wireless communication systems.
In 2003, he became a Faculty Member with The
University of Manchester, U.K., where he is cur-
rently a Lecturer on communication engineering subjects. His research
interests include development of PHY and MAC layers techniques for wired
and wireless communication networks, with particular focus on cognitive
radio, interference mitigation, multiuser MIMO, spectrum optimization, and
Green systems. He was a co-recipient of the Best Paper Award of the
IEEE Symposium on Power Line Communications 2014. He has served
as a Technical Program Committee member on numerous IEEE flagship
conferences and co-chaired the Greencomm Track in VTC spring 2016.
VOLUME 5, 2017 13921
